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ABSTRACT 
AMARA JOCELIN BOOTH: Healthcare Reform in the United States: Why Structures 
Matter 
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens) 
 
 
In 2008, the year Barack Obama was elected president, nearly fifty million people in 
the United States did not have health insurance.  Of those who did, 102 million had plans 
which covered neither their illnesses, nor the medications they needed, sufficiently 
(Hellander 2008).  Many of the people who did have coverage became aware of the limits of 
their policy only after they became sick and were told by their insurance company that their 
condition would not be covered.  Soon after his inauguration, President Obama made clear 
that reform of the healthcare system would be a key legislative priority for his administration.  
Other presidents before him had attempted such reform, and each time they had come up 
short.  Their failure was, in large part, due to the structural and institutional composition of 
the United States, which presents formidable obstacles to those attempting to overhaul the 
system.  This paper explores the uniquely American experience with healthcare, focusing on 
the institutional and structural impediments reformers have faced on the road to reform. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There is nothing more difficult to manage, more dubious to accomplish, nor 
more doubtful of success ... than to initiate a new order of things. The 
reformer has enemies in all those who profit from the old order and only 
lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit from the new order 
(Niccolò Machiavelli quoted in Wilsford 1994: 251).  
 
 These words, written hundreds of years ago, paint an accurate picture of the way 
attempts at healthcare reform in the United States have gone in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries.  
Major reform attempts were undertaken by Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1960s, by Bill Clinton 
in the 1990s, and by Barack Obama in 2009/10.  This list is by no means exhaustive; many 
others, Republican and Democrat alike, have tried to change the system, and all have faced 
uphill battles.  And, while some attempts have been successful, the vitriol with which 
opponents have attacked both proposed legislation and its proponents has been, at once, 
spectacular and puzzling.  Moreover, since the end of World War II, most attempts at 
healthcare reform have failed, which has served to further legitimize the strategies employed 
by those opposed to change, and led many to question whether the United States will ever 
fully implement a universal healthcare system.  This skepticism is certainly warranted, and in 
this paper I argue that the difficulty in achieving major reform in the United States is owed in 
large part to its structural and institutional composition, both of which present formidable 
obstacles to anyone attempting to overhaul the healthcare system.  In the first section, I 
discuss federalism, and compare Canada and the United States in order to highlight the 
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opportunities and constraints presented by the federalist structure of government; in section 
two, I examine the presidential system of government, the lack of party discipline inherent to 
it, the ways in which this system allows elected officials to pursue their own political self-
interests and be influenced by interest groups, and how this has hurt attempts at major 
reform; in the third section, I examine the two party system in the United States, the ways in 
which it creates an inhospitable environment for the emergence of third parties (including a 
social democratic party), and how the absence of this type of third party has impeded the 
passage and implementation of a national healthcare plan in the United States; in the fourth 
section, I explore the road to, and eventual success of, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act; in the fifth section, I conclude.  It is my hope that an analysis of these areas will 
help answer the question: Why has major healthcare reform been so difficult to achieve in the 
United States? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
HEALTHCARE REFORM AND THE FEDERALIST STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA 
 
 
The process of healthcare reform in Canada and the US has differed greatly, both in 
terms of processes and outcomes, since the end of World War II.  This is somewhat 
surprising given the many major similarities the two neighbors share – both are stable 
democracies; both hail from Anglo-Saxon roots, and are liberal market economies; the 
structure of both governments is federalist; both share common religious and cultural 
traditions; and, both are advanced industrial welfare capitalist states.  As such, these two 
nations are archetypical for a Most Similar Systems Design of research.  In this section, I 
compare the federalist structure present in the United States to that which exists in Canada.  
It is my hope that such a comparison will shed light on the ways in which the American 
“brand” of federalism has, and continues to, impact healthcare reform efforts in the United 
States. 
The Federalist Structure  
The Constitution of the United States lays out a federalist framework whereby power 
is divided between the federal government, and those of the individual states.  Similarly, the 
British North America Act of 1867, which provided for confederation of Canadian provinces, 
delineates the distribution of powers between the national government (the Parliament) and 
the provincial legislatures.  Since the end of World War II, attempts to introduce major 
reforms to healthcare have been undertaken in both Canada (in the 1950s, and again in the 
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1960s) and in the United States (in the 1960s, 1990s, and in 2009/10).  Of significant 
consequence to healthcare reform in both Canada and the United States, was/is the federalist 
structure of government that exists in each.  However, despite a similar division of power, the 
outcome of reform attempts in the two countries has been divergent.  In Canada, the 
provincial-federal relationship has significantly influenced the emergence and evolution of 
the Canadian system (Maioni 2002).  Here, the federalist structure has promoted a climate of 
interaction between the two levels of government that has helped ameliorate the kind of 
volatility described in this paper’s opening quote by Machiavelli.  Conversely, Machiavelli’s 
words nicely sum up what has taken place in the United States during each of the attempts at 
major reform.  The successful passage of the Obama Administration’s Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) notwithstanding, the healthcare reform process in the United 
States has been consistently plagued by ambiguity over jurisdiction.  Inherent to the federalist 
structure is the division of power, but where healthcare is concerned, there lacks in the US, a 
consensus as to which entity ought to have provisional and fiscal authority: the states or the 
federal government.  State-level solutions are likely to have limited success, due to the 
constraints of the federalist structure; and federal-level solutions have been hampered due to 
a seeming (and understandable) lack of political willingness to undertake sweeping reform 
efforts (Bobinski 1990).    
Conversely, in the Canadian brand of federalism, there exists no ambiguity: 
constitutional jurisdiction over the administration and financing of healthcare is clearly 
delineated, and lies exclusively with the provinces.  For decades, this structural reality has 
opened windows of opportunity for reformers in Canada to pursue policy change at the 
provincial level (Tuohy 1999).  
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Red Light, Green Light: Federalism as Traffic Cop 
 Political institutions in the United States are not designed to support or encourage 
expansive reform. The institutions are highly fragmented, with power divided between a 
strong judicial branch, the Senate, the House, multiple executive departments, and the White 
House.  This fragmentation offers a menu of veto points to groups and powerful individuals 
seeking to influence (or derail) reform efforts.
1
  The division of authority between these 
entities is in addition to that prescribed by federalism.  Given this political environment, it 
can be said that when major reform passes in the United States, it happens in spite of 
institutional and federalist structures, not because of them.   
Over the years, healthcare policy entrepreneurs have faced uphill battles as they have 
sought to find ways to work through and around the constraints posed by these structures.  In 
the case of the passage of Medicare (and Medicaid), it took a national tragedy to bring about 
a window of opportunity within which President Johnson was able to act.  The assassination 
of President Kennedy produced a temporary shift in the political context, one which Johnson 
immediately recognized and seized upon.  He realized that in the few months following 
Kennedy’s death, Members of Congress would be unlikely to vote against legislation that 
was tied to the fallen Kennedy (Tolleson-Rinehart 2010).  Johnson’s window of opportunity 
was further widened in 1964, by his landslide victory in the presidential election, coupled 
with Democratic control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.  Combined, 
these circumstances were a political coup for Johnson, enabling him to overcome the 
obstacles his proposed reforms faced, just long enough to get them passed.  However, the 
federalist structure present in the 1960s could not support Medicare and the expenditures and 
coordination it would entail.  Johnson and the other reformists involved had to find a way to 
                                                          
1
 See Immergut (1990) for her groundbreaking introduction and discussion of veto points. 
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surmount this challenge, and did so via a substantial expansion of the federalist structure to 
include actors beyond federal and state governments. His administration’s expansion of 
existing programs, and the initiation of new ones, meant that the private sector, along with 
quasi-government and traditional government agencies, were eligible for grant funds.  In 
some instances, assistance bypassed states and went directly or indirectly to local 
governments, some of whom saw a three-fold increase in their funding (Walker 1974).  That 
the implementation of Medicare required a significant expansion of the federalist structure of 
government is a poignant reminder of the constraints it, along with institutional barriers, can 
pose to efforts at major policy reform in the United States.    
In Canada, federalism has, on occasion, stifled efforts at healthcare reform too; 
however, it has also provided important opportunities for progress and innovation (Maioni 
1998).  In particular, because Canada’s Constitution grants the provinces jurisdiction over 
healthcare, reform in this area has been much less volatile than in the United States.  In the 
following sub-section, I will elucidate upon the ways in which Canada’s brand of federalism 
allowed the federal government to fashion its national healthcare plan based on those already 
up and running in several provinces, Saskatchewan in particular.   
Federalism and Healthcare Reform Outcomes        
In the 1960s, Canada experienced economic prosperity, and Ottawa and the provinces 
enjoyed good relations.  Even those between Ontario and Quebec were solid, which had not 
always been the case.  The late 1950s saw the implementation of government-sponsored 
hospital insurance, and in 1966, the Medical Care Act, which extended coverage beyond 
hospital care to include comprehensive medical insurance, was signed into law.  The policy 
design of both programs was heavily influenced by that already in existence in several 
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provinces.  Under the social-democratic Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) 
government, Saskatchewan was the first to adopt a comprehensive plan in 1962, followed by 
Alberta, which in 1963, implemented a program to help low-income individuals pay for 
private insurance.  Soon after, British Columbia and Ontario developed programs designed to 
offer their residents an alternative to purchasing insurance from private companies (Tuohy 
1999).  The Canadian brand of federalism facilitated and encouraged this type of design and 
implementation of universal hospital and medical insurance at the provincial level.  Further, 
it provided a mechanism by which the public medical and hospital insurance innovations, 
conceived of at the provincial level, could be diffused across the entire nation (Maioni 2002).  
Progressive provincial governments, such as the CCF in Saskatchewan, were instrumental in 
this process.  In addition, the notion that healthcare ought to be accessible to everyone, 
without regard to financial means, enjoyed broad public support.  Physicians were also 
widely amenable to the legislation, because it allowed them to maintain control over clinical 
decision making, even if some limitations were placed on their entrepreneurial capacities 
(Hutchison, Abelson, and Lavis 2001).  
 In the United States, federalism does not offer the same facilitative mechanisms for 
major healthcare reform; nor do the institutions.  In the decades following the end of World 
War II, several states attempted to address healthcare and faced uphill battles.  The 
challenges can be sourced, at least in part, to federalism.  As states have endeavored to 
address the issues of access and cost, their efforts have been hurt by federalism doctrines 
which impede the ability of individual states to regulate the healthcare market (Parmet 1993).  
In addition, when states do seek the autonomy necessary to develop reforms, they often 
experience push-back and competition from interest groups operating at the national-level.  
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This is so because most meaningful state-level reforms, especially those which are 
healthcare-related, require federal funding, which means the states must obtain Congressional 
approval.  This has pitted states against the influential, well-funded lobbyists who 
aggressively advocate on behalf of the private interests they represent in Washington.  In this 
match-up, states are often at a disadvantage, with their reform goals frequently subjugated by 
the desires of powerful interest groups and their lobbyists with direct access to Members of 
Congress.
2
   
This reality notwithstanding, states have, on occasion, served as “laboratory 
experiments” for social policy.  Reforms enacted in one state can have a 
demonstration/replication effect on others, especially when the changes are shown to be 
substantively, financially, and administratively feasible (Nathan 2005).  In addition, when 
one state successfully implements reform, it gives reform-minded strategists in other states 
useful insight into how to neutralize opposition, and garner public support for their efforts.  
That the individual states are in a unique position to influence healthcare policy outside of 
their borders, whether intentionally or not, is quite evident.  And, while the ability of state 
legislatures to implement healthcare reform at the state-level is impeded by the federalist 
structure, when states do experience reform successes, others are likely to follow in their 
footsteps.  Moreover, as demonstrated by the universal health plan conceived of and 
implemented in Massachusetts, in 2006, under then Governor Mitt Romney, it is possible for 
progressive reforms undertaken at the state-level to be adopted at the federal-level.  
However, instances of this type of policy adoption, especially where major healthcare-related 
reform is concerned, are quite rare in the United States, especially when compared to its 
                                                          
2
 See Laguarda (1993) for a thorough discussion on the state-level healthcare reform efforts attempted in 
Hawaii and Oregon.  
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northerly neighbor.  Perhaps then, the issue is less about innovation, or even about 
implementation.  Maybe the challenge in establishing a universal healthcare program in the 
United States is in overcoming the ambivalence surrounding the very notion that 
government, be it state or federal, ought to be part of the provision and funding of healthcare, 
at all.   
Despite the many similarities between Canada and the United States, there has been 
significant divergence between the two where healthcare policy is concerned.  In this section, 
I have explored this issue through the lens of federalism, in an effort to illustrate the ways in 
which federal-provincial/state relationships and interactions have, and continue to, influence 
healthcare policy in the two neighboring countries.  Through this comparison, I hope to have 
teased out some of the specific hurdles the American “brand” of federalism presents to those 
attempting to make major reforms to the healthcare system.  In the next section, I turn to a 
discussion of the presidential system of government in the United States.  Here, I will explore 
how the lack of party discipline, which emerges from this system, leads elected officials to 
pursue their own political self-interests and leaves them open to influence by lobbyists and 
interest groups.  
CHAPTER 3 
THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
                  
 Under the presidential system, the executive branch of government exists alongside, 
but separately from, the legislative branch.  Accordingly, in the United States, the president is 
elected independently of the Members of Congress.  In theory, this system is designed to 
provide checks and balances on the power of both branches, and while it serves that purpose, 
it can also lead to political impasses, as has been the case with healthcare reform attempts.  
Further, the separation of power in the American presidential system often impedes broad, 
sweeping reform, favoring instead smaller, incremental change.  As a result, contentious but 
often important parts of proposed legislation are removed in order to push through at least 
some measure of reform.  Such was the case with the portion of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act dealing with the planning of end of life care for patients on Medicare.  
This portion of the legislation simply allowed physicians to bill Medicare for the time they 
spent discussing end of life options and care with patients and their families.  Items discussed 
during such visits might include: what a patient suffering from a chronic illness can expect in 
their final days; whether or not the patient wants to remain at home with hospice care; and 
whether or not the patient wants to assign decision-making authority to a loved one in the 
event they become unable to make decisions on their own.  However, with the help of 
conservative strategist Betsy McCaughey, Sarah Palin was successful in stirring up 
controversy around the bill by equating this particular provision to a “Death
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Panel.”  In the end, despite the completely unfounded claim that this portion of the bill would 
cut off care for the critically ill as a means by which to save money, Democrats agreed to 
drop it from PPACA, in order to push the legislation through.     
 Although the “Death Panel” case is an extreme example, the presidential system does 
foster an environment in which ordinary Americans and groups wishing to influence the 
policy-making process can do so (Palin began making the “Death Panel” claims in 2009 as a 
private citizen, after she and McCain lost the election in 2008).  And, while Sarah Palin is not 
your run-of-the-mill American, the system does provide the average citizen a means by 
which to actively engage the political process.  This system also offers members of the 
legislative branch a broader palette of options from which to choose, as compared to their 
cohorts in parliamentary systems, who are fully expected to toe their respective party line.  In 
this section, I will explore the opportunities and constraints posed by the presidential system, 
and the ways in which attempts at major healthcare reform have thus been affected.    
Party Discipline  
In the American presidential system, political parties have always been weaker than 
their cohorts in parliamentary systems.  Members of Congress are prime targets of wealthy 
lobbying and interest groups, and often, these groups prove more important to a candidate’s 
(re)election than do the parties to which a candidate or incumbent belongs.  In the U.S., 
Congressional Members have a strong incentive to place greater emphasis on the wishes of 
wealthy campaign donors than on the directives of their party (Huber and Stephens 2001).  
This reality was illustrated in 1974, when Vice-President Gerald Ford initiated a new move 
toward establishing a national healthcare plan.      
 The country had just been rocked by the Watergate Scandal, President Nixon had 
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resigned under disgrace, and the general perception of government was that it lacked 
integrity and was incompetent.  Ford, along with several influential Members of Congress, 
saw undertaking major reform of the healthcare system a means by which to repair their 
reputation in the eyes of their constituents.  Wilbur Mills, Chair of the powerful House Ways 
and Means Committee, and instrumental figure in the successful passage of Medicare in the 
mid-1960s, was put in charge of the effort.  Despite overwhelming support for the bill in 
general, a consensus on the issues of cost and mandatory participation could not be reached.  
As a result, Mills concluded that there was no point in bringing the bill to the House, since 
such a weak consensus within his committee signaled a sure failure in the House of 
Representatives.  Mills reasoned that strong consensus in his committee was critical “because 
of the traditional absence of party discipline in this great federal republic” (Mills cited in 
Steinmo and Watts 1995: 354).  Despite the respect and authority he held, even Mills was 
powerless in getting the members of his own committee to toe the party line.  Without the 
type of party discipline which is present in parliamentary systems, substantial reform to the 
American healthcare system has been stymied.  As the 1974 case illustrates, even when there 
is broad consensus among political elites, an entire piece of legislation can be stopped in its 
tracks when individual legislators, often spurred by (wealthy and influential) interested 
parties, begin haggling over a bill’s minutiae.   
 Another area of concern which arises from the lack of party discipline inherent to the 
presidential system of government is the possibility, even probability, that the Congressional 
majority will be comprised of the party opposite that of the president.  Further, even when a 
single party holds the Executive Office and both Houses of Congress, consensus on 
legislation, especially when it is expansive, is far from guaranteed.  As a result, unlike in 
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parliamentarianism, partisan majorities do not always lead to policy majorities in the United 
States (Oberlander 2003).  An example of this phenomenon can be found in the near non-
passage of PPACA in 2010, despite a Democrat as president and Democratic control of the 
House, as well as the Senate.    
As mentioned earlier, in addition to impacting party discipline, the presidential 
system of government also opens doors to individuals and groups who are interested in 
influencing elected officials, especially Members of Congress.  As a result, many interested 
parties have enjoyed, and taken full advantage of, the opportunity this access grants them to 
throw their two cents into the decision-making process.  In the following sub-section, I 
elucidate further upon the extensive role interest groups have played in American healthcare 
reform debates. 
The Impact of Interest Groups: The Clinton Case 
 On September 22, 1993, President Bill Clinton stood before Congress and gave a 
nationally-televised speech about the state of healthcare in the United States, during which he 
introduced his ill-fated healthcare reform bill, the Health Security Act (HSA).  Initially, the 
response was overwhelmingly positive.  Millions watched the address, and polls taken 
immediately following its broadcast indicated strong support for Clinton’s plan.  In addition, 
the Clinton’s enjoyed the support of many Congressional Members from both parties 
(Skocpol 1997).  A year later, the Health Security Act was declared dead.  The bill’s demise 
was largely attributable to special interest groups which received funding from a variety of 
industries who, combined, generated $800 billion a year (The Center for Public Integrity 
1994).            
 With so much at stake, those who felt they stood to lose if the legislation were to 
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pass, launched myriad attacks designed to dismantle the proposed bill.  Without delay, 
various stakeholder groups began sending their members notifications which painted the 
HSA in a negative light.  In addition, some of these groups formed coalitions, which funded 
attack ads and public polling efforts, intended to sway public opinion against reform 
(Skocpol 1997).  One of the most commonly used refrains against the HSA was that the 
passage and implementation of a national healthcare plan would mean that decisions about a 
patient’s own health would be taken away from them and their doctors, and instead be made 
by faceless bureaucrats employed by an ever-growing federal government.  Conspicuously 
absent from such claims was any mention that there was already a robust, inefficient, and for-
profit bureaucracy controlling much of the healthcare landscape in the United States, that 
being insurance companies.  For patients who are covered by health insurance, virtually no 
decision by either a healthcare provider or a patient is made without a great deal of 
consideration of what will, and more importantly what will not, be covered by a given 
insurer.  Concerned about what the Health Security Act might do to business, several insurers 
came together to present a united front against the plan.  One such group was the Health 
Insurance Association of America (HIAA), made up of small and medium-sized insurance 
companies.  This group was very influential, even after many of its smaller members and a 
handful of its largest, left to form their own associations in the early 1990s.  The HIAA 
employed several strategies in its battle against the Health Security Act, including making the 
claim that any expansive reform to healthcare would necessarily result in the loss of jobs.   In 
order to get their message across, the association used their well-established network of 
contacts and substantial resources to target small businesses, insurance company employees, 
older citizens, and veterans’ groups, asserting that the HSA would mean tighter bureaucratic 
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controls and would result in the loss of jobs (Skocpol 1997).  The suggestion that the passage 
of a bill will cost jobs, especially in the small business sector, can be very effective, 
particularly when the economy is poor and unemployment rates are high.    
 In addition to enjoying a wide range of connections in the private sector, HIAA also 
benefitted from the adept leadership of Willis Gradison, a Republican who left his position in 
Congress and on the Sub-committee on Health of the House Ways and Means Committee, to 
take the position with HIAA.  Under Gradison, the association made it clear to Clinton that 
he could expect its continued support so long as the bill would allow HIAA’s members to 
continue to “cherry-pick” who it insured.  By employing this tactic, the insurance companies 
were able to keep premiums low for their customers because they only extended coverage to 
the healthiest applicants.  The Clinton Administration refused to include such language in the 
bill and in short order, HIAA produced damaging attack ads replete with assertions that the 
Health Security plan would lead to socialized medicine.  The HIAA was also responsible for 
the now infamous series of advertisements featuring Harry and Louise, a white, middle-class 
couple in their forties, who are pictured in their home lamenting the Clinton plan.  These ads 
were influenced by the soap opera genre, did not look at all like a political campaign 
message, and cost a lot of money to produce.  Only the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers Association spent more than the Health Insurance Association of America 
($14 million) on their efforts to stop the Health Security Act (Goldsteen, et al 2001).  In the 
advertisements, Harry and Louise appeared supportive of universal coverage.  They “agreed 
with the president on healthcare for everyone,” but the problem was “in the details” (quoted 
in Goldsteen, et al 2001: 1332).  By scripting the message in this manner, the ad’s writers 
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made sure the Harry and Louise characters aligned well with the majority of the public who 
found it troubling that tens of millions of Americans lacked adequate access to healthcare. 
These advertisements illustrate another specific strategy that has been used by those 
opposed to reform: the claim that they are not opposed to reform, in general; just this 
particular reform.  In this way, some of the fiercest, most ideologically extreme opponents 
have been able to frame their position as one of willingness to compromise, just not on 
certain details.  In so doing, they are able to present themselves as moderates, whose views 
are in keeping with those of mainstream America.   
 The most potent, influential individuals and groups opposed to Clinton’s healthcare 
reforms were well-funded, well-organized, and effective in their endeavors to dismantle his 
Administration’s proposed plan.  Such had also been the case during attempts at reform prior 
to the 1990s, and was certainly the case in 2009, when Obama rolled out the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.  In addition to running advertisements, organizing 
marches and protests, mailing pamphlets, making phone calls, and engaging the media, 
groups interested in impeding or promoting a particular agenda enjoy a degree of access to 
legislators that surpasses that which is available in countries with parliamentary government 
systems.  Hospital associations, medical equipment and device manufacturers, doctor 
associations, drug companies, and as mentioned, insurance companies are all well aware of 
this opportunity, and are eager to exploit the advantages the presidential system of 
government provides them.  But what is it about this latter system that allows interested 
parties to influence the decision making process?  In the following sub-section I will explore 
the ways in which American presidentialism fosters an environment which is conducive to 
interest group involvement at the policy-making level.  
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Presidentialism: Interest, Access, and Influence 
 As discussed earlier, the American system of government does not promote party 
discipline, and there is often little incentive for a politician to strictly adhere to any policy 
measure that is unpopular in her/his district.  As such, if a group which is opposed to a 
particular proposal can convince a sufficient number of elected officials that their 
constituents are not in favor of said legislation, it is certainly possible, if not probable, that 
these legislators can be counted on to vote in line with the group’s wishes.  Interest groups 
seek to assure elected officials of voters’ preferences by offering “proof.”  One such way to 
provide it is by conducting polling, as was done by the more well-endowed groups opposed 
to the Clinton reforms (Skocpol 1997).  After carefully selecting sampling data indicating 
that likely voters were opposed to the Health Security Act, these groups would then submit 
the findings to the Members of Congress whom they expected would be influenced by the 
results.       
Another means by which to assure legislators that the interest group is providing 
accurate information on where constituents lie on an issue is for it to hold and record 
meetings, rallies, and marches in which substantial numbers of expected voters are in 
attendance.  For example, the Tea Party Movement is a large group of likely voters that claim 
to be non-partisan, but are consistently opposed to most of the proposals made by the Obama 
White House.  This movement enjoys a significant amount of airtime in the mainstream 
media, both in coverage of its rallies and by mention in interviews with members of both the 
Democratic and Republican parties, as well as by political pundits.  Special interest groups 
opposed to PPACA often cite the loud, boisterous, and committed Tea Party Movement 
(which is considered by many to be an interest group in and of itself) to legislators as “proof” 
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that the majority of Americans are opposed to Obama’s healthcare bill.  In contrast, those 
who stand to benefit the most from a universal healthcare plan – the uninsured and 
underinsured – do not comprise a single, unified group such as the Tea Party, nor do they 
enjoy the financial support those opposed to reform have historically received from the 
medical-industrial complex (Oberlander 2003).  The tens of millions of under- and un-
insured Americans hail from various geographical, ethnic, religious, and political 
backgrounds.  They have little in common, other than their lack of adequate health insurance, 
and the diversity of this sizeable American minority has consistently left it without a 
powerful lobbying group to advocate on its behalf.  As such, the voices of the under- and un-
insured often go unheard by Members of Congress, and are often drowned-out by well-
organized, well-funded groups opposed to reform. 
Another, and perhaps the most potent, means by which interest groups influence 
policy is through monetary contributions to campaigns.  Procuring and maintaining financial 
support for campaigns is a never-ending part of a Congress Member’s life, regardless of 
whether it is an election year or not.  This is so because in order to have a chance at election, 
or re-election in the case of incumbents, a candidate’s political campaign must be well-
financed.  And while many who aspire to Congressional office are independently wealthy 
and contribute significant amounts of their own money to their campaign efforts, most are 
also forced to seek and accept funds from private donors in order to remain relevant as 
candidates.  Exorbitant amounts of money were spent during the 2010 general elections, and 
it seems unlikely that reforms to decrease campaign spending, or move toward public 
financing, will be undertaken any time soon.  In fact, in its 2010 decision on Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the 
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government may not restrict or limit campaign contributions by labor unions, corporations, or 
any other organizations in elections.  In so doing, the Court expanded the extensive – and 
uniquely American – role private interests play in the policy-making process.  Under this 
presidential system, where individual legislators rely heavily on donations, interest groups 
with money to spend can often find candidates and incumbents willing to sit down and listen 
to their views on the issues.     
 Unlike in parliamentary systems of government, the United States’ presidential 
system has presented unique challenges to the various healthcare reform efforts that have 
been attempted in the decades following the end of the Second World War.  The constraints 
of the separation of powers and the imperatives of partisan coalition building can and have 
hampered consensus on health reform.  In a highly fragmented political arena, competition 
between the executive branch and the legislature can serve to stymie the development and 
implementation of significant reform.  Furthermore, the absence of party discipline and the 
permeable nature of congressional politics allow opponents of universal coverage a greater 
role in the political process (Maioni 1998).
 
        
 In the following section, I will turn to a discussion of the two-party system in the 
United States, the ways in which it discourages third parties, and how the lack of a social 
democratic party has hurt attempts at healthcare reform. 
  
CHAPTER 4 
THE ABSENCE OF A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE U.S. AND ITS IMPACT 
ON HEALTHCARE POLICY 
 
 In the United States, electoral politics have been dominated by two parties throughout 
(almost) all of the republic’s existence, with either a Democrat or a Republican winning 
every presidential election, and one or the other party controlling the Houses of Congress 
(Bibby and Maisel 2003).  Over the course of American history, individual third party 
candidates have, on occasion, been competitive in Congressional races, however very few 
have actually won.  Furthermore, since the end of World War II, third party candidates have, 
at best, stood only a slight chance at victory in just a handful of presidential elections – Strom 
Thurmond in 1948; George Wallace in 1968; John B. Anderson in 1980; Ross Perot in 1992, 
and again in 1996.  Indeed, in the United States, it is almost impossible for a member of a 
party other than the Democrats or Republicans to gain a foothold in American politics.  But, 
why?  In the following sub-sections, I will address this question and, as was the case with 
federalism, will provide a comparison between the United States and Canada, which has an 
active social democratic party, in order to provide greater elucidation upon the ways in which 
the absence of a social democratic party can impact healthcare reform efforts. 
Third Parties Need Not Apply        
 The United States has a single-member district electoral system, meaning that where 
elections are concerned, the winner takes all.  Unlike with proportional representation, unless 
a candidate is first past the post, thereby winning outright, neither they nor their party
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receive any representation.  This poses an often insurmountable hurdle to third parties, 
because even if a party’s candidates were sufficiently popular to carry several districts, it is 
not enough.  The need to secure a majority of votes across a majority of districts presents a 
daunting challenge to candidates of third parties.   
 In addition, just getting one’s name on the ballot can be an extraordinarily onerous 
task.  Candidates must spend an inordinate amount of time and money soliciting voters to 
sign a petition just to be eligible to have their name listed on the ballot.  This is so because 
unless your name appears on the ballot, your candidacy simply does not exist.  While the 
number of signatures required to get one’s name on a presidential ballot varies by state, the 
bottom line is that candidates must obtain over half a million signatures nationwide, in order 
to qualify.  As Theresa Amato, who ran Ralph Nader’s 2000 presidential campaign explains, 
meeting this requirement requires a Herculean effort.    
If you are a campaign that is subject to a massive major-party attack … you 
have to collect between double and triple the required number of signatures to 
inoculate against lawsuits and challenges. So a third party or independent 
campaign really has to collect 8,000 to 12,000 signatures a day.  Now if you 
have ever tried to circulate a greeting card in your office or among family 
members to get people to sign on time for a birthday, or if you have tried to 
get signatures for a block-party permit, you may have a ten-thousandth of an 
idea of how difficult it is to collect this many signatures across fifty states and 
the District of Columbia (Amato 2009: 29).  
 
Third party candidates also face having their campaign platform(s) hijacked by the 
major parties.  This scenario plays out when the position a third party candidate takes on an 
issue garners considerable support among likely voters.  In such cases, major parties look to 
capitalize on the popularity of that position by incorporating it into their own campaigns, 
thereby increasing their appeal to voters in favor of the particular platform.  This can prove 
fatal to the third party candidate, as it can effectively remove their raison d’être.  Throughout 
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American history, there have been multiple instances where the Democrats and Republicans 
have charted a policy course with the goal of luring support away from the Independent.  The 
1968 presidential election provides one such example, when former Governor of Alabama, 
George Wallace, proved a formidable opponent to Nixon, the Republican candidate.  In this 
case, the pro-segregationist Wallace garnered a significant degree of support in several 
southern states, which alarmed both major parties and forced the Republicans to adopt a 
platform designed to appeal to southern whites opposed to desegregation and equal rights 
(Rosentone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996).   
The challenges third parties face is but one of multiple explanations for the lack of a 
social democratic party in the United States.  Lipset (1977) provides a thorough analysis of 
the vast literature on the issue in his perennial essay, “Why No Socialism in the United 
States?”  In it, he explains that most hypotheses fall into one of two categories: the 
sociological, political and economic make-up of the American society; and, factors present 
within the individual progressive movements which have emerged over the course of 
American history.  Lipset provides a comparison of Canada and the United States in which 
he explicates that socialists in Canada were able to form an electorally viable party, the 
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, largely because unlike Roosevelt in the U.S., 
Canada lacked a charismatic reform leader.  The absence of a Roosevelt-equivalent in 
Canada allowed the socialist movement to grow there during the Great Depression.  
In the following discussion, I continue the comparison of Canada and the United 
States, with an analysis of the ways in which the lack of a social democratic party in the latter 
country has made provision of universal healthcare less likely than in the former, where such 
a party does exist.  
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Social Democratic Influence in Canada and the United States 
 Like the United States, Canada has never had a social democratic party in power at 
the national-level.  This similarity sets both countries apart from the majority of welfare 
capitalist nations because social democratic leadership at the federal level is often correlated 
with well-developed welfare states.  However, unlike the U.S., there has been a viable social-
democratic party, which has been engaged in provincial and federal politics in Canada, since 
the 1930s (Maioni 1998).  Furthermore, the labor movement has enjoyed a significant degree 
of influence in Canadian politics as a direct result of the presence of a third Left party.  
Conversely, in the United States, organized labor stuck to its nonpartisan conventions and 
chose not to pursue political relationships with the Left, at least not until well after its 
Canadian counterpart had chosen to do so.  By then, the American two-party system was 
well-entrenched, and labor’s only option was to align with the Democratic Party, which 
was/is ideologically Right of social democratic parties.  As a result of the choices the labor 
movement in the United States made early on, it has not exerted the influence its cohorts in 
other industrialized nations have. 
 According to Navarro (1989), the lack of a powerful labor influence necessarily has a 
devastating effect on the establishment of universal healthcare.  He contends that the creation 
of a national healthcare system in any nation is directly related to the existence and agency of 
the labor movement present in that country, and that the movement’s authority is exerted via 
labor’s economic and political instruments: unions and parties, respectively.  In his insightful 
article, Navarro discusses the ways in which labor has sought to establish universal 
healthcare coverage in multiple countries, and more specifically, has endeavored to do so by 
disengaging benefits from the labor market.  Labor’s efforts have been at odds with the 
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capitalist class, which typically prefers occupational-related health insurance provided 
through private insurance companies.  This model typically strengthens the employee’s 
attachment to, and reliance on, the employer, while simultaneously reinforcing inequalities 
amongst wage-earners.  By promoting these types of inequalities and sharp class distinctions 
amongst workers, status cleavages have developed, which thwarted the formation of broad 
class coalitions amongst laborers in the United States (Esping-Andersen cited in Navarro 
1989).   
The laissez-faire, capitalist convention has been, and continues to be, very strong in 
the U.S.  Furthermore, the notion that one ought not rely on government for help, but should 
instead provide for themselves, is an ideology deeply ingrained in the American psyche.  It 
was not until the Great Depression that the fallibility of the markets reared its head and 
created a window of opportunity for Roosevelt and his New Deal.  However, even during this 
time of immense economic hardship, and the passage of FDR’s reforms, the tradition of 
American self-reliance and individualism remained.  Roosevelt’s new contributory social 
programs were presented to the public as quasi-contractual agreements, whereby citizens 
earned their benefits by making individual contributions over the course of their working 
lives (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988).  Rimlinger (1993), an advocate of the national values 
approach, argues that this focus on contractual rights is significant because it highlights the 
notion that the individual should not be rendered dependent upon the benevolence of the 
state.  He contends that the American commitment to individualism and self-reliance led to 
an intransigent resistance to the provision of benefits and services by the government.  This 
national values approach runs contrary to the position taken by social democratic parties, 
which value the principle of social-ownership over individualism (Constitution of the New 
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Democratic Party: Preamble).  In fact, the presence of a social democratic party is, according 
to Huber and Stephens (2000), the defining factor in the public delivery of services and one 
of the key determinants of public funding for the provision of social welfare programs. 
 While, as mentioned above, Canadians have not elected a social democratic candidate 
to the Prime Ministership, these parties have and do exert significant influence at both the 
provincial and federal levels.  Further, the presence of a viable social democratic party offers 
an alternative which is absent in the US, one which made possible the creation and 
implementation of Canada’s national healthcare plan (Horowitz 1966).  
Given the myriad obstacles standing in the way of meaningful reform in the United 
States, the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on March 23, 2010, is 
truly remarkable.  Considering the erstwhile, yet ultimately ill-fated attempts at healthcare 
reform undertaken by previous administrations, how is it that the 44
th
 President of the United 
States accomplished this monumental feat?  In the following section, we examine the twists 
and turns on the road to the passage of PPACA.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
HOW PRESIDENT OBAMA GOT IT DONE 
 
 Forty-four days after his inauguration, President Obama invited representatives from 
the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), university professors, dozens of Members 
of Congress, and ordinary Americans to participate in his White House Forum on Health 
Reform (2009).  In addition to these groups, the president also asked representatives from 
pharmaceutical companies, health insurance companies, physician associations, hospital 
associations, medical device and equipment manufacturers, and other business interests to 
participate.  The purpose of this forum was to bring these varied groups together and to allow 
each of them a voice in the healthcare reform process.  By extending an invitation to key 
industry players, Obama signaled his willingness to bring all relevant parties into the 
discussion, especially those who had mounted the most potent opposition during previous 
attempts at health reform.  Where President Clinton had adopted a populist, anti-industry 
stance during his attempt at healthcare reform in the 1990s, President Obama rejected such 
industry-bashing, seeking instead to create a more hospitable environment, one in which big-
business would be less likely to ally against him (Calmes 2009).  Despite criticism from 
members of his own party, Obama remained stubbornly committed to cultivating a working 
relationship with these economic heavy-hitters, understanding that without an (uneasy) peace 
with them, there would be no reform (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010).   
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Beyond the lessons learned from previous Democratic presidents, Obama’s strategy 
was also informed by the experience of his Republican predecessor, George W. Bush.  In his 
successful attempt to pass the Medicare prescription drug benefit, Bush cut considerable 
deals with interest groups.  Similarly, Obama understood that if he wanted to achieve success 
in his endeavors, he would have to be willing to make deals and come to compromises with 
all stakeholders, even if this meant alienating some of his base (Altman and Shactman 2011).  
President Obama’s insistence on bringing all relevant players to the table early on, and his 
particular emphasis on keeping key health industry groups involved at every step of the 
process, was a key part of his strategy for success.  The president was under no false 
illusions, accommodating stakeholders was an absolutely necessary part of getting “things 
done within the system as it is” (Axelrod quoted in Baker 2010: paragraph 8).  Obama used 
every opportunity afforded him as president as he pushed for reform, including the use of the 
bully pulpit.  In the speech he gave at the White House Forum on Health Reform (2009), the 
president answered critics who claimed that given the economic crisis, now was not the time 
to initiate major reform. 
All it takes is one stroke of bad luck—an accident or illness; a divorce or lost 
job—to become one of the nearly 46 million uninsured or the millions who 
have healthcare, but can’t afford it … healthcare reform is no longer just a 
moral imperative, it is a fiscal imperative. If we want to create jobs and 
rebuild our economy, then we must address the crushing cost of healthcare 
this year, in this Administration (White House 2009: 1-2).  
 
In tying universal healthcare coverage to economic recovery, Obama introduced what 
would become a common refrain and a crucial element in the selling of his plan: the bottom-
line of physicians, health insurance companies, medical device and equipment 
manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and hospitals is best served when coverage is 
available to all Americans.  Obama’s strategy was clear: bring as many stakeholders, whether 
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friend or foe, to the table early in order to develop a plan that would ultimately enjoy the 
support (or at least minimize the opposition) of these groups.  It seemed to have worked, 
because on May 11, 2009, six major players - the American Medical Association (AMA), the 
Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), America’s Health Insurance Plans 
(AHIP), the American Hospital Association (AHA), Pharmaceutical Researchers and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
signed a letter in support of reform (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010).  And, two days later in a 
press conference on the South Lawn of the White House, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi 
stated that she was “quite certain” healthcare “legislation will be on the floor by the end of 
July” (Pelosi 2009).   
However, when on July 13, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs was asked 
about the president’s desire to have a bill on his desk by the August recess, the Secretary 
struck a less-optimistic note on the timeline.  He replied, “I don’t think anybody was under 
the illusion that the whole process would be wrapped up by the beginning of August” (Gibbs 
2009).  As it turned out, Gibbs’ pessimism was thoroughly warranted; an agreement would 
not be reached before the Congressional summer recess.  Even with a Democratic president 
and Democrats in control of Congress, health reform, having been resurrected, was once 
again in a fight for its life. 
The First Signs of Trouble         
 By the beginning of August, 2009, the economic crisis was front and center for 
almost every American.  Millions had lost their homes, national unemployment rates hovered 
around 10% (Taranto 2009), and many whose life-savings were tied up in the stock market 
suffered devastating losses when the value of their investments plummeted.  Despite the 
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president’s assertion that now was the time to pursue universal healthcare, many citizens 
were angry and health reform made an attractive target upon which to unleash their 
frustrations.  As was typical during the summer recess, representatives returned to their 
districts and held town hall meetings.  Atypically, several of them erupted into rowdy and 
sometimes violent confrontations.  In one such gathering, 1,500 people packed an event in a 
Tampa, Florida, suburb to meet with US Representative Kathy Castor and State 
Representative Betty Reed.  The event quickly became a near riot, with scuffles breaking out 
and venomous rhetoric spewed toward proponents of reform (Fox News 2009).  It was a 
scene repeated throughout the country.  At some meetings, Obama was compared to Hitler by 
individuals carrying signs with swastikas, whereas others issued dire warnings of euthanasia 
and socialism (Altman and Shactman 2011).  Media coverage of such hysterical claims, 
attack ads from the Right, and the insistence by former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin that 
Obama’s plan would result in death panels, took its toll, and public support for reform began 
to wane.  Despite this, as summer turned to fall and Members of Congress returned to 
Washington, healthcare reform continued to plod along.   
A Determined President 
On September 9, 2009, facing staunch opposition from those on the Right, as well as 
members of his own party who were pushing for more liberal measures, Obama addressed a 
nationally-televised Joint Session of Congress in which he outlined his plan.  Up to this 
point, Obama had been criticized by some for not taking a more prominent leadership role in 
the process.  This hands-off strategy, however, was well-calculated and came about as a 
direct result of lessons learned from Bill Clinton’s experiences a decade and a half earlier.  
Many agree that Clinton had made a critical misstep when he chose to develop his plan 
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almost exclusively in the White House amongst his advisors, as opposed to including 
Congress in the process.  This tactic left members of the House and Senate, even those of his 
own party, disenchanted and unwilling to get onboard with his plan (Altman and Shactman 
2011).  In contrast, Obama laid out the framework for his plan, but left it up to Congress to 
develop the specifics.
3
  While these details were still being hashed out within the House and 
Senate, Obama addressed Congress and the nation in the joint session (President 2009).  In 
his speech, he touched on three key components:  
 Those who have health insurance can keep it.  Insurance companies will 
be prohibited from denying coverage for preexisting conditions and from 
dropping people when their care is deemed too costly. In addition, placing 
yearly and lifetime caps on coverage will no longer be allowed; 
 
 The millions of Americans who do not have insurance will be able to 
obtain it through insurance exchanges in which they may choose from a 
variety of insurers competing for their business. Those who are still unable 
to pay for these plans, even at the more affordable rates, will be eligible 
for need-based tax credits to help offset the costs; 
 
 Just as motorists are required to carry vehicle insurance, this plan requires 
all individuals to carry health insurance, and most businesses will be 
required to offer it to their employees. For the most impoverished, those 
who even with the help of tax credits can still not afford coverage, and for 
the vast majority of small businesses, an exemption will be provided. 
 
While many predicted that Obama’s efforts to reform healthcare would fail, given the 
bruising he and the Democrats had taken over the summer, and despite the political-risk to 
which his pursuits were exposing both him and the rest of his party, his stirring address 
signaled his unrelenting commitment to reform.  But, Obama was not alone in his 
determination – Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Senate Majority Leader 
                                                          
3
 Five separate committees were charged with this task. Three House committees: Education and Labor; 
Energy and Commerce; Ways and Means. And, two Senate committees: Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions (HELP); and Finance.  
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Harry Reid (D-NV) remained steadfast, as well.  But as time marched on and winter set in, 
the political will of even the most dedicated Democrats in the House and Senate would be 
challenged, and the patience of ordinary citizens watching it all play out on the 24/7 news 
reel would be thoroughly tried.  
The House           
 By early November, 2009, the House committees charged with developing their 
version of the plan – the Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962 – had 
completed their work, and a vote on the bill would be held the first Saturday of that month.  
The Democrats enjoyed a solid majority in the House of Representatives – 258-177 – but, 
despite this, getting the bill through the House would be far from a slam dunk.  By now, the 
Republicans had adopted the same tactic the party had implemented with great success 
during the last attempt at healthcare reform under Clinton in the early 1990s.  Under the 
leadership of Newt Gingrich, who was then the House Minority Whip, along with Texas 
Representative Dick Armey and William Kristol, chair of the Project for the Republican 
Future, GOP response to Clinton’s plan was simple: oppose it at every step, regardless of its 
content and what it would mean for the American people.  The strategy of the GOP 
leadership in 1993-4 seemed geared more toward embarrassing the Democrats, than it was 
about discussing how to reform the system in the direction of universal coverage (Skocpol 
1997).  In the end, as discussed earlier, Clinton’s Health Security Act failed, due in large part 
to the success of the stratagem adopted by the Republican Party.   
With present day House Republicans hoping for a similar failure on the part of 
Obama, and signaling their intent to mimic the tactics used in the 1990s, Pelosi knew she 
could not count on a single House Republican vote.  That meant that she would need at least 
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218 Democrats of diverging geographical and ideological positions to sign on in order to pass 
the bill.  She had members who were pro-choice and pro-life, some who were pro-labor and 
some who were pro-business, those who favored a single-payer system and conservative 
Blue Dog Democrats who favored a free-market approach (Altman and Shactman 2011).  In 
short, she faced a daunting task in finding enough common ground to bring a sufficient 
number of them onboard.   
  Differences on several major issues threatened to derail the House bill, none the least 
of which was abortion.  Of the 258 Democratic House members, about forty of them led by 
Bart Stupak (D-MI), opposed abortion.  Specifically, they were concerned that insurance 
plans subsidized by federal funds, including those on the insurance exchanges touted by 
Obama in his September address to Congress, would be used to pay for abortion services.  
This, despite the care taken by Democratic leaders to strictly adhere to the spirit of the 1976 
Hyde Amendment, which prohibits federal funds from being used to pay for abortions 
“except when it is necessary to save the life of the mother or when the pregnancy is the result 
of an act of rape or incest” (US House 1976).  This, however, was not enough to assuage 
Stupak who, along with his like-minded colleagues, had enough votes to derail the entire 
reform process.  As such, the Speaker, who was a liberal, pro-choice Democrat, had no 
choice but to entertain their demands.  Stupak offered an amendment forbidding any 
insurance company who participated in the insurance exchange from covering all abortion 
services, since some individuals covered under these plans may be receiving federal 
subsidies to pay for them (US House 2009).  With little room to maneuver, Pelosi reluctantly 
agreed to allow Stupak’s amendment to come to a vote, knowing full-well that she faced an 
uphill battle in trying to persuade the pro-choice members of the House to go along with it 
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(New York Times 2012).  With great skill, and because of the respect she had earned over 
the course of her many years in public office, the Speaker convinced enough pro-choice 
members to vote for the Stupak Amendment.  Days later, she restated publicly what had 
likely become a common refrain in her discussions with pro-choice Democrats: “This is not a 
bill about abortion; this is a bill about healthcare” (McMorris-Santoro 2009: paragraph 2). 
On November 7, 2009, Stupak’s amendment passed the House by a vote of 240-194, 
making way for the vote on the Affordable Health Care for America Act, which followed 
shortly thereafter.  And, with a vote of 220-215, the bill passed – Speaker Pelosi, hundreds of 
House Democrats, and one lone Republican (Anh Cao of Louisiana’s 2nd District) – had 
achieved a monumental victory in the push toward universal healthcare.  The next stop on the 
road to reform was the Senate, and President Obama urged its members to “take up the baton 
and bring this effort to the finish line” (Obama quoted in Stolberg 2009: paragraph 1). 
The Senate           
 Just as Pelosi had faced myriad challenges in her pursuit on behalf of universal 
healthcare, so too did her counterpart in the Senate, Majority Leader Harry Reid.  Holding 58 
of the 100 seats, the Democrats had the majority, and with the two Independent members 
caucusing with the Democrats, the party enjoyed a filibuster-proof super-majority.  However, 
the simplicity of the math belies the difficulties Reid would face.   
One of the key issues facing Reid was whether or not to include a public option in the 
Senate plan.  The public option would establish a health insurance plan that is government-
run and would offer individuals and businesses an alternative to private insurance.  Because 
such an alternative would cost consumers less than plans offered in the private marketplace, 
insurance companies were vehemently opposed.  They feared they would be forced to drop 
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their prices in order to compete, which would cut into the hundreds of millions of dollars 
they made in profit each year.  In addition, and not surprisingly, Senate Republicans were 
also opposed.  What was more problematic for Reid was that despite multiple attempts, the 
Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Democrat Max Baucus of Montana, remained 
unsuccessful in his attempts to win over enough Democratic members to include a public 
option in the Senate bill.  As such, it did not make it into the final bill.   
Another area of contention was, again, abortion.  Ben Nelson (D-NE) made clear his 
unwillingness to sign onto the bill unless additional restrictions were placed on abortion 
rights.  Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Patricia Murray (D-WA) stood equally firm in their 
defense of reproductive rights.  Seven days before Christmas, all three, along with Chuck 
Schumer (D-NY) and Harry Reid were gathered in Reid’s office trying desperately to reach a 
compromise, although Nelson was at one end of the office, while the two women were 
hunkered down in Reid’s chief of staff’s office at the other end (Kane 2009).  After hours 
upon hours of negotiating, with both Schumer and Reid shuttling between the parties, an 
agreement was reached.  Nelson secured the compromise that had ultimately been rejected in 
the House the previous month, meaning the Senate bill would now prohibit government 
funds from being used to pay for abortion services in any plan purchased from an insurance 
exchange.  As such, anyone desiring such coverage would have to pay for it using their own 
personal funds.  Furthermore, Nelson added a provision allowing any state to forbid the 
inclusion of abortion coverage in the insurance exchanges it set up, meaning that even if an 
individual wanted to use their own funds to pay for the coverage, it may not be available in 
their state (Altman and Shactman 2011).  Staunch supporters of a woman’s right to choose, 
agreeing to include such language in the Senate bill was, no doubt, difficult for Boxer and 
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Murray.  However, at 10:30pm on December 18, they acquiesced and a deal was reached.  
Exhausted, Boxer and Nelson, who had not actually spoken during the intense negotiations, 
embraced.  Within minutes Reid was on the phone to Obama, who was on Air Force One, 
returning from a summit on global warming: “We did it, Mr. President” (Kane 2009: 
paragraph 3).  
            The Senate bill was now coming closer to a vote, and there was cautious optimism 
among reform supporters that it would indeed pass.  On the other side, Republicans were 
incensed and mounted every effort available in order to derail the process, including 
scheduling six procedural votes, which would require every Democratic Senator and both 
Independent Senators to vote in each one.  If even one vote were lost anywhere along the 
way, the Senate version of the healthcare bill may not survive.  Making it even more 
challenging for Reid to maintain his fragile super-majority was the weather – a blizzard hit 
Washington, dropping a record amount of snow and making travel perilous, right in the 
middle of the series of crucial votes (Ballisty 2009).  With this as the backdrop, Reid brought 
the bill to the Senate floor on December 19.  Republican Minority Leader Mitch McConnell 
responded by employing a common strategy used to delay legislation: he required the entire 
383-page document to be read out loud, immediately following Reid’s introduction of the bill 
to the Senate floor (Altman and Shactman 2011).  Seven hours later, once Senate aides had 
finished reading, the Republicans initiated a filibuster; Reid responded by scheduling a 
cloture vote for Monday, December 21, at 1:00am.  This was a critical vote, because if all 
sixty senators were willing to return in the middle of a snowy night to vote for cloture, it was 
highly probable they would maintain their support all the way through to the end.  
 Shortly after midnight, senators from both parties began arriving, including the ailing 
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92-year old Robert Byrd (D-WV), who was wheeled in.  And, perhaps in a gesture toward all 
those who had fought healthcare reform over the years, or perhaps one directed toward the 
Republicans who had publicly encouraged people to pray that “somebody can’t make the 
vote tonight,” Byrd, when his name was called, “shot his right index finger into the air as he 
shouted ‘aye,’ then pumped his left fist in defiance” (Milbank 2009: final paragraph).  The 
motion for cloture barely passed with a vote of 60-40, and after several other attempts at 
delay, the Republicans agreed to proceed with the final vote. The date was set for December 
24.    
On Christmas Eve, Senator Byrd once again captured in gesture and in words the 
monumental nature of the moment and the years of hard-fought battles that culminated on 
this winter day.  It is routine during Senate roll-call votes for Senators to simply raise their 
hand when their name is called and state either ‘aye’ or ‘nay.’  However, Senator Byrd broke 
with this tradition.  When his name was called, he enthusiastically thrust his arm in the air, 
held up a single finger, and exclaimed, “This is for my friend Ted Kennedy – Aye!” (quoted 
in Altman and Shactman 2011: 313). 
The final vote on the Senate healthcare bill was 60-39, and the results represented an 
enormous achievement for Democrats.  However, there was still much work to be done after 
the Christmas recess, including reconciling the Senate and House bills.  Reformers would 
continue to face formidable opposition and the loss of one of its greatest supporters, Senator 
Ted Kennedy (D-MA), would be felt even more deeply after the January 19, 2010, special 
election to fill his seat. 
The Election of Scott Brown and Reconciliation      
 It became clear to most in the week leading up to the election between Democrat 
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Martha Coakley and the relatively unknown Republican, Brown, that it was plausible, if not 
probable, he would win.  Nevertheless, his victory was shocking, given that Massachusetts is 
the bluest of the blue states, and that the seat’s previous occupant, Kennedy, had held it for 
almost half a century.  With the seat going to the GOP, the Democrats had lost their super-
majority in the Senate, leaving Republicans, political pundits, and even some Democrats 
convinced that this was the end of the road for healthcare reform, and all but guaranteed 
Obama would be a one-term president.   
  Congressional Democrats floundered publicly in the weeks following Brown’s 
election.  Eventually, however, they, their progressive allies, and several key stakeholders 
that Obama had reached out to during his March 2009 healthcare forum, finally came 
together to redouble their efforts.  Despite the initial shock and dismay, the Brown victory 
had ironically served to galvanize reformers, leading Congressional Democrats to cooperate 
more fully and to intensify their commitment to seeing health reform through to the end 
(Jacobs and Skocpol 2010).  A key moment in the turnaround came on January 29, when 
Obama traveled to Baltimore to meet with GOP lawmakers gathered at a House Republican 
retreat.  It was agreed by all parties, in advance, that discussions would focus on healthcare 
and that the event would be nationally-televised.  Despite the hostile environment, the 
president agreed to take any and all questions asked of him.  In his article, “Obama Goes To 
GOP Lions’ Den -- And Mauls the Lions,”  journalist Sam Stein extoled Obama’s 
performance, explaining that it “was at once defiant, substantive and engaging,” noting that 
Obama scolded Republicans for playing petty politics, deflected their policy critiques, and 
corrected their misstatements (Stein 2010: paragraph 1).  Several more televised events were 
held in which the president outlined the specifics of his plan (basically a summary of the 
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provisions the Senate and House had already agreed upon) and continued to publicly make 
the case for reform.  With Obama doing his part, Congressional Democrats soon stepped up 
to the plate. 
 Having lost their super-majority in the Senate, Reid and Pelosi decided to pursue a 
shrewd two-step approach.  First, the House would pass the Senate version of the bill, which 
now had a sidecar bill containing several key taxing and spending provisions that House 
members wanted included.  Once it passed the House, it, along with the sidecar, were sent 
back to the Senate, where passage required only a simple majority (a process known as 
reconciliation).  Several last minute details had to be addressed, including getting a handful 
of anti-abortion House members, led by Bart Stupak, on board.  To do this, Obama agreed to 
sign an Executive Order reinforcing the prohibition on the use of government funding for 
abortion already contained in the legislation.  This promise, along with the public support of 
tens of thousands of Catholic nuns and the Catholic Health Association, was enough to 
convince the Stupak holdouts to sign on (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010). 
Success! 
 On March 21, 2010, the House passed the Senate bill – the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), H.R. 3590 – by a vote of 219-212; and the side car bill – the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, H.R. 4872 – by a vote of 220-211.  Two days 
later, President Obama signed PPACA into law.  On March 26, the Senate passed the sidecar 
bill, through reconciliation, by a vote of 56-43.  Four days later, President Obama completed 
the historic process by signing it – the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act – into 
law.  It was all, as Vice President Joe Biden stated, “a big f*****g deal!” (Herszenhorn 
2010: paragraph 3).           
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 The process, however, is not yet complete, with implementation of the various pieces 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act set to continue over the coming months.  
The process will not culminate until 2014, when the most controversial piece of the 
legislation – the individual mandate – goes into effect.  Twenty-six states have filed a lawsuit 
challenging the law, and over the course of three days in late March, 2012, the Supreme 
Court of the United States heard oral arguments in the case, officially referred to as Florida 
v. Department of Health & Human Services.
4
  The individual mandate component of 
PPACA, which requires every American (except very low-income individuals who cannot 
afford it and/or those with religious objections) to obtain health insurance, takes effect 
January 1, 2014.  In addition, by this date, all employers must offer health insurance to their 
employees (firms with fewer than 50 workers are exempt).  Individuals and businesses that 
do not follow this rule will be assessed monetary penalties.  However, when the mandate 
goes into effect, insurance plans will be much more affordable for at least two reasons: tens 
of millions of Americans will be purchasing new policies, which will drive costs down, and 
government subsidies and employer support will be made available to help make insurance 
more affordable for all (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010).   
While the individual mandate has been red meat for those opposed to reform, it is 
neither radical, nor is it without precedent.  The same principle underlying the mandatory 
purchasing of health insurance is the same long-accepted logic behind mandating the 
purchase of vehicle insurance: everyone is better off when the vast majority is insured, 
otherwise those who do have coverage end up bearing the costs for those who do not.  If a 
                                                          
4
 The 26 States in the lawsuit before the Supreme Court are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming 
(C-SPAN 2012).  
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person without medical insurance is treated at the hospital for a broken bone or a heart attack 
and cannot pay their bill, those costs are then spread out amongst those who do have 
insurance because doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies all raise the prices insured 
parties pay, in order to cover the money they lose on patients who are uninsured and do not 
pay.  As such, the individual mandate is a necessary and commonsense part of the Affordable 
Care Act.  The Supreme Court is expected to issue its ruling on the act’s constitutionality in 
June, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 As I hope has been made clear in this essay, there is no single explanation for why 
major healthcare reform has been so difficult to achieve in the United States.  That there are 
multiple contributing factors is not surprising given the complexity of the issue; the 
economic, social, and political implications involved; and the number of stakeholders 
concerned.  In these pages, I have explored three areas that contribute to the explanation: 
federalism, the presidential system of government, and the lack of a social democratic party.  
By undertaking this analysis, it is my hope that a clearer picture of the challenges faced by 
those endeavoring to implement major reforms to the American system of healthcare delivery 
and financing has emerged.  Given the long history of formidable obstacles to this type of 
reform, President Obama and Congressional Democrats deserve high praise for their success 
in passing this monumental piece of legislation.   
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